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A. REQUIREMENTS FOR MARINE CORPS AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C 3 )
1. MAGTF Organization
Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) provide a rapid and
flexible response for world-wide contingencies and combat operations in "every
clime and place". 1 From the Arctic regions of northern Norway to the Pacific and
Southwest Asian theaters, MAGTFs in the form of Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEUs), Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) or Marine Expeditionary Forces
(MEFs) are task organized to accomplish specifically assigned missions for which
they are especially tailored. Although MAGTFs generally vary significantly in force
composition, the organizational structure includes a command element, a ground
combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element
(logistics). (Ref. 1, p. 7)
2. Communication Requirements
The MAGTF commander needs sufficient and continuous communication
capability to maintain command and control of subordinate, supporting, and adjacent
units and to communicate with higher headquarters and other agencies. Various
communication systems provide him the capability to:
• Command assigned forces;
• Control and coordinate movement, supporting fires, and logistic support;
and
• Collect and disseminate information.
These communication systems are defined as either telecommunication or
physical communication systems. Telecommunication systems include those
associated with electrical or electronic communications such as radio, telephone, and
Words from the Marine Corps Hymn
data transmissions as well as visual and sound systems. Messenger service and mail
are considered physical communication means. (Ref. 1, p. 29-30)
Communication users throughout the MAGTF are responsible for
identifying their information transfer needs and requirements. Communication units
(e.g. , detachments, platoons, companies, battalions) are attached to headquarters units
throughout the MAGTF to provide technical advice and resources to plan, install,
operate, and maintain telecommunication circuits and pathways in response to user
needs and requirements. Clearly then, communication planning is not exclusively a
function of the communication unit. Effective communication planning must occur
throughout the system from user to receiver.
B. COMMUNICATION PLANNING AND ECONOMICS
1. Communication Planning Definition:
"Communications planning is the process of creating, mobilizing, and/or
allocating communications resources to achieve goals within a particular social,
cultural, political and economic context." (Ref. 2, p.283)
2. What Is Communication Planning?
Communication planning is concerned with the efficient transfer of
information between members of a group and other groups. More specifically,
communication planning focuses on those channels and facilities necessary to
provide the means to accomplish this information transfer in a cost effective
manner. Communication planners strive to balance the requirements for information
transfer (benefits) with the limitations of available systems, costs, benefits, budgetary
constraints, and other factors (costs) to reach an optimal and efficient distribution of
limited communication resources; that is, to achieve a balance between costs and
benefits.
Optimal and efficient distribution, however, is seen differently by many
communication planners depending upon their point of view, individual definitions
of costs and benefits, and expectations. For example, a MAGTF has different
specific goals and objectives than the Marine Corps as a whole. Therefore, what
may be considered mission essential to the MAGTF commander might be
considered necessary, but not as necessary, to higher level organization with
conflicting priorities. If priorities are filled by the higher level organization, the
MAGTF may experience considerable delay in fulfilling its need.
Cost-benefit analysis, cost effectiveness analysis, and similar tools are
often used to defend or define their perceptions of optimality and efficiency.
3. How economics influences communication planning.
a. The role of economics in telecommunication planning.
Economics provides a tool for planners to focus on optimal and
efficient use of communication resources. This tool helps to identify, analyze, and
quantify alternatives such as:
• Levels of communication services availability;
• Access to these services;
• Use of communication channels and facilities; and
• Costs and benefits associated with providing these services.
b. Use of economic concepts in analysis of communication problems.
An economics based decision making model assists in providing
solutions to communication problems by determining and evaluating the multiplicity
of factors involved with:
• Selection between alternative means;
• Allocations of human, financial, and technological resources; and
• Design of messages/information to have certain/desired affects with
particular audiences.
C. ECONOMICS, COMMUNICATION PLANNING, AND UHF SATELLITE
GROUND TERMINAL EQUIPMENT EMPLOYMENT
Economics attempts to define and determine what is optimal and what is
efficient. Public and private sector economists, however, find it much easier to
define optimality and efficiency than to determine actual quantities which achieve
these standards. Within telecommunications, this problem is compounded by the
wide range of communication resources available. Within radio telecommunications
alone, resource allocation is unmanageable across the radio frequency spectrum.
This thesis specifically looks at telecommunication economic theory and attempts to
use it to provide a framework from which better informed decisions about UHF
satellite communication ground terminal equipment acquisition and employment can
be made.
II. TELECOMMUNICATION ECONOMICS THEORY
A. INTRODUCTION
Applied economics attempts to maximize the net benefits obtained from the
allocation of scarce resources. This chapter briefly reviews basic economic theory
and begins to explore the application of economics to telecommunication resource
allocation.
B. REVIEW OF GENERAL ECONOMIC THEORY
1. Demand
a. Definition.
A demand function is a list of prices and corresponding quantities that
consumers are willing and able to purchase in some time period, all other
things held constant. Consumers are willing and able to purchase more of an
item the lower the price; that is, quantity demanded per time period varies
inversely with price. [Ref. 3, p. 22]
b. Discussion.
Demand is directly linked to price. As prices rise, consumers
become less willing or unable to purchase goods in the same quantity as before.
Consumption of resources drops. This concept is easily illustrated by the gasoline
shortage of the early 1970's. As gasoline prices rose and waiting lines grew longer,
Americans stopped purchasing gasoline at the same quantities as before.
Alternatively, as prices go down, consumption rises.
(1) Demand Function. The demand function describes the factors
which affect consumption levels of one unique good or service. These factors are
called determinants of demand. For a given demand function, the values assigned
for each determinant are fixed. The familiar demand curve graphically represents
the relationship between price and quantity demanded for this single demand
function. As determinants are changed or varied, new demand functions are
defined, each with a unique demand curve and unique item. Movement along a
specific demand curve indicates changes in quantity demanded of that unique item
as its price changes. As prices or costs of the unique item increase, demand will
decrease, and vice-versa. Movements between demand curves indicate a change in
demand due to a change in the underlying determinants.
Figure 1 helps illustrate this concept. Curve D, shows the
quantity demanded of the item represented by this curve increases as the price
changes from A to B. When comparing similar but not identical items, each item
is represented by an unique demand function and curve. Curves D,, D2 , and D3
represent similar items but not identical items (perhaps different brands of beer or
candy bars). As illustrated, demand for D3 is greater than demand for D, and D2 .
If two goods are substitutes, then changes in quantity
demanded of one item causes an inverse change in quantity demanded of the other
item. For example, assume facsimile systems and express mail were perfect
substitutes (e.g. , either service would satisfy user needs equally). As express mail
costs increased, user demand for facsimile services would similarly increase
(although this shift might not be proportional to the decrease in demand for express
mail).
If two goods are complements, then changes in quantity
demanded for one item creates a corresponding change in quantity demanded for the
complement. For example, assume telephone calls required a follow-on letter of
confirmation. As telephone call prices increased and demand for telephone calls
subsequently decreased, the demand for follow-on letters would similarly decrease.
(2) Telecommunication Demand Determinants. Assume for a
moment a demand function with linear relationship between variables X and Y such
that: Y = a + bX. In this example, a and b are constants, Y is the dependant
variable, X is the independent variable. That is, the value associated with Y
depends upon the value of X while any value of X may be assumed. In
telecommunication economics, demand determinants are classified as either
dependant or independent variables. This distinction is responsible for creating
points on a specific demand curve. As assigned values of X change, new values of
Y are plotted. Changing the number, type or character of the independent variables
in a demand function may create similar yet separate and unique demand curves
Figure 1
. Demand functions
and functions. 2 Table 1 presents some determinants of demand associated with
military communications. Although this table of determinants is by no means
complete, it does represent many of the factors which must be evaluated within the
demand function. The relationships between the dependant and independent
:Changes in price are generally associated with movement
along a curve rather than movements between curves.
TABLE 1. MILITARY COMMUNICATION DETERMINANTS OF DEMAND
Dependent Variables
Number of messages originating and terminating
within the organization.
The number of messages originating within the
organization and terminating in another military
organization (e.g., Navy originator, Marine Corps
receiving)
.
The number of messages originating within the
organization and terminating in another non-
military government agency.
The number of messages originating in the




Average price of communications (message) using
current transmission system.
Average price of communications using alternative
transmission system (e.g., military system




Average transmission time for message.
Average time to complete a communication





Security, reliability, flexibility of system.
Mission requirements.
Accessibility of system.
User familiarity with system.
[Table adapted from Ref.4, p. 86]
variables may vary with forecasting techniques depending upon model assumptions
about relative importance of each variable. Forecasting models which assume only
a few determinants or which fail to define the determinants completely may
overlook significant factors which influence demand.
2. Supply
a. Definition.
"Supply is a list of prices and the corresponding quantities that a
group of suppliers (firms) would be willing and able to offer for sale at each price
per period of time, other things held constant." [Ref. 3, p.30]
b. Discussion
Supply is closely linked to price. As the price for a good or
service rises, suppliers are willing to supply greater quantities of that good or
service. For example, during the 1970's, the gasoline shortage resulted in higher
prices for gasoline. Domestic oil companies became willing to tap resources that
were previously unprofitable at the lower price. As oil prices dropped in the
1980's, less profitable oil wells were once again capped as they became
uneconomic.
Similar to the demand function, a specific set of determinants
define a supply function for a unique good. Changes to the determinants create
separate and unique supply functions and curves. Telecommunication determinants
of supply focus on the various costs associated with providing telecommunication
services to the user. In this case, the Marine Corps represents a social or overall
user. Private users are individual users within a social user group. Social supply
functions (e.g., for the Marine Corps as a whole) differ significantly from the supply
functions observed by the private user because the private user does not recognize
all the costs. Table 2 lists a few of the different determinants of supply for social
and private telecommunication users. As shown, individual or private user costs do
not account for much of the cost of providing goods or services like UHF satellite
communications (SATCOM). Costs borne by the society (e.g., acquisition, operator
training , and depot-level maintenance) are not directly felt in the individual user's
wallet (i.e.
;
operating budget). Additionally, individual operating budgets do not
TABLE 2
.
MILITARY COMMUNICATION DETERMINANTS OF SUPPLY
Individual User
• Operating costs











Field and depot level maintenance





Military occupational specialty (MOS) schools







recognize or feel the opportunity costs associated with their budgets. For each
individual budget funded, the Marine Corps loses that money for alternative projects.
The costs borne by the individual user are substantially less than the actual cost of
providing UHF satcom services.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between social costs and private
costs. As discussed, the social cost function recognizes greater costs than the
private user cost function. Therefore, for a given quantity X, the private user
believes the cost observed is B rather than the actual higher cost of A. Clearly, if
individual users only bear a portion of the total cost, the cost of supplying a
particular level of output is lower for individuals than it is for society. These
functions merge only when both users recognize the same costs.
3. Optimal allocation of resources (MC=MB)
Unconstrained optimization implies that resources are expended as long as
the benefit received from expending one more resource unit exceeds the cost of one
more resource unit. Using additional resources is generally associated with some
increase in activity level.
Constrained optimization implies that resources are not unlimited, rather
that some limit (budgetary constraints, resource availability, etc.) prevents an infinite
growth in expenditure or activity levels. In this case, resources are expended as
long as the benefit received from expending one more resource unit exceeds the
cost of one more resource unit AND the imposed limit on resource expenditures has
not been exceeded.
The optimal allocation of resources, therefore, is that point where the
expenditure of one additional resource unit just equals the benefit received.
Marginal cost (MC) refers to the cost associated with providing and using one
additional unit of resource. The supply curve measures the MC of expanding
output.
Marginal benefit (MB) is the value that users receive from using one
additional resource unit. The demand curve measures MB captured by users when
they are provided one additional unit of output. Mathematically, the optimal
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allocation of any resource occurs at the point where MC = MB, subject to any









SMC: SOCIAL MARGINAL COST
PMC: PRIVATE MARGINAL COST
Figure 2 . Social and private cost relationships
In the case of two supply functions (social and private), two cost curves
are derived: a social marginal cost (SMC) and a private marginal cost (PMC). Each
curve results in an "optimal" allocation of resources at the point where the marginal
cost curve crosses the demand curve. As implied by Figure 3, the individual supply














SMC : Social PMarginal Cost PMC : Private Marginal Cost
1 Excess Resource Alloation
Figure 3 . Resource allocations
horizontal distance between the two observed optimal points represents an excess
resource allocation. This may be illustrated further using UHF ground terminal
satellite communications. Demand for these assets would be greater at the
individual level than at the social level. The Marine Corps, recognizing all costs
associated with the supply of these systems, is unwilling to provide the same
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quantity of ground terminals that individual users would provide (request) at their
recognized cost levels. Since costs are higher at the Marine Corps level, Marine
Corps-wide demand for UHF satcom is lower. At the lower individual cost level, a
greater quantity is demanded. Therefore, a more appropriate allocation of resources
occurs using the social marginal cost in computing optimality.
C. DEMAND FOR ACCESS AND DEMAND FOR USE
Previously, a generic demand curve for a given telecommunication system or
service was assumed. Within telecommunications, however, two separate yet related
demand curves exist:
• Demand for Access; and
• Demand for Use (once access is achieved).
Demand for access and demand for use of a telecommunication service are
interrelated in a complex fashion. Demand for access implies that some demand
exists for potential users to have the capability to use a service without regard to if,
when, or how they use the service. Demand for use of service implies the user has
access to the service and now wants to use it. For example, having a
telephone on a desk gives a potential user access to telephone services. Picking up
the phone and placing a call actually uses the service. Similarly, the demand
functions for UHF satcom ground terminal access and use are related but not
equivalent.
Determinants of demand for access are implied through the UHF satcom
ground terminal acquisition process. Needs and requirements are expressed by the
user. In turn, equipment is purchased to satisfy these needs. Ownership or
availability of ground terminal equipment grants access (subject to a separate
demand for access issue which focuses on access to satellite channels).
Demand for use is a separate economic consideration often discussed in terms
of usage sensitive billing, priority pricing mechanisms, etc. This thesis does not
address demand for use topics.
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D. DEMAND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Demand management techniques target excess demand for reduction. If excess
demand is created by the circumstances depicted in Figure 3, additional consumer
costs can be introduced to simulate the cost differences between individual and
social determinants of supply. As additional individual user costs are introduced,
the individual user's supply function more closely mimics the social supply function,
resulting in a reduced quantity demanded. Perfect demand management achieves
optimality by forcing the individual supply function to equal the demand function at
the socially optimal level. Priority models and pricing models describe demand for
access management techniques.
1. Priority Models
Priority demand for access management implies access to
telecommunication services is limited, and that higher value users gain access first
while lower value users gain access later, if at all. Additionally, equal value users
gain access on a first come, first served basis. The greater waiting costs associated
with not having access incurred by lower value users results in a lower quantity
demanded of this service. Lower value users therefore shift to a substitute service
which they can access (or forego the service altogether). For example, users
wanting access to a UHF satellite communication channel are prioritized in a
manner to be discussed later. Users with high priorities are assured access. Users
with lower priorities may either be bumped if they already have access or may be
denied access when they want it. The priority system encourages low value users
to employ alternate telecommunication means with lower relative waiting costs (e.g.
mail or telephone) to reduce the demand for access. Since precedence equals value,
resources are allocated to users with highest precedence which results in a more
optimal distribution of limited resources. Of course, this procedure has inherent
weaknesses which include:
• Procedures for detemiining precedence may be flawed;
What is high precedence to receiver may be of low value to the transmitter
and vice-versa;
15
• Precedence abuse creates false "high value" users and undermines the
system; and
• The first come, first served mechanism does not allow for differences in
relative importance of equivalently valued messages;
All flash 3 traffic looks alike
2. Pricing Models
Pricing models create an additional costs to the user. This shifts the
supply curve resulting in a lower demand for access. Three pricing schemes
include:
• Peak load pricing;
• Priority pricing; and
• Quantity pricing.
Peak pricing is most useful when demand fluctuates predictably over
time. Peak pricing charges higher prices during high demand periods and lower
prices during low demand periods. For example, during major news events like the
Olympics or political conventions, commercial broadcasters might be charged higher
prices to access local transmission facilities (e.g. telephone leased lines, microwave,
etc.). This higher price would discourage low value users, such as local television
stations, from demanding access. High value users, such as large broadcasting
networks (e.g.
;
ABC, NBC, CBS, ESPN, CNN) would pay the higher price
associated with access. After the event, local access charges might be reduced to
stimulate demand.
Priority pricing incorporates the priority management system, discussed in
section D.l. of this chapter, with an explicit cost for declaring higher precedence.
Priority pricing is useful when demand fluctuates randomly over a time period.
True high value users are willing to pay for the higher precedence and associated
access. Low value users are willing to wait for some lower demand level/period.
Military message traffic is prioritzed as routine,




Quantity pricing is most useful when demand chronically exceeds supply.
Quantity pricing reduces demand for access by charging some premium for greater
access. For example, the telephone company might charge one price for access to
one phone line and a higher price for access to two phone lines. This higher price
would be greater than twice the price for one phone line. As a result, fewer people
would desire two phones. Quantity pricing has the opposite effect of a high volume
user discount which encourages greater consumption.
Pricing schemes may be used individually or in combinations to achieve
the optimal demand level. Table 3 reviews the basic relationship between demand
levels and pricing schemes.
TABLE 3. DEMAND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES











The strengths and weaknesses of pricing schemes can be summarized as
follows:
a. Strengths
• Pricing models are most useful when the product is economically non-
storable and demand fluctuates over time;
• Pricing models cause the private user to recognize social costs as well as
individual costs associated with the communications, resulting in higher
observed prices and thus lower demand;
• Pricing models allow the user to make economic decisions to achieve
optimal social demand levels;
— User determines length of access (longer access = higher price);
— User determines number of units needed (price increases as requirements
increase);
— User determines precedence of requirement (higher precedence = higher
price); and
• Pricing models discourage consumption in peak periods and shift lower
value consumption to off-peak periods;
— Thus, they spread usage levels out over time and achieve more uniform
utilization;
— Pricing models automatically adjust to the new optimal allocation level
when demand or supply change over time (Administrative policies require
administrative action to adjust).
b. Weaknesses
• Pricing models are difficult to implement;
— A major hurdle is "Who pays?" Ideally, the person who pays should be
the person who benefits most from the communications. Should the user
pay or should the command directing the user to employ a certain system
pay? For example, if a user is directed to submit a certain report via a
satcom net, should the sender pay or should the receiver pay?
— The controlling agency must overcome user resistance to change (after all,
who wants to start paying for something that used to be "free");
— Supply and demand functions are difficult to quantify. As such, it is
difficult to identify true optimality (the point where demand = social
supply);
• Using pricing models, how do you price services?
— Real money transfers may be inappropriate (or illegal);
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— Pseudo-money or money substitutes may not provide a realistic incentive to
conserve (for example, playing with fake money budgets or tokens that
have no real value does not feel the same as allocating some part of a real
budget towards a decision);
— Non-financial prices may be ineffective (witness how quickly repeated
threats and other "nasty-grams" soon loose their impact); and
• With pricing models in place, how do you pay for needed resources when
over budget?
E. REVIEW
The supreme goal of economics is to determine the optimal allocation of a
scarce resource. To do so, an understanding of supply, demand, and optimality and
demand management is necessary.
The qualitative determinants of demand and supply help quantify demand and
supply functions. Since social users and private users observe different costs, at
least two supply functions exist. Uncorrected, private supply considerations will
always lead to an excess demand for a good or service (in this case, access to UHF
satcom ground terminals). The optimal allocation of resources occurs at the point
where the social supply function equals the demand function (S = D; MC = MB).
Demand management techniques force private supply functions to recognize greater
costs and thereby become more like the social supply function.
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III. MARINE CORPS UHF SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Marine Corps has acquired and will continue to acquire specific UHF
satcom ground terminals. The growth in demand for access to these terminals is a
result of the perceived improvements in capabilities for command, control, and
communications provided to MAGTF units. These acquisitions provide MAGTF
units the ability to access specific naval communication pathways. This chapter
reviews UHF satcom ground terminal characteristics and the communication
pathways employed by the MAGTF.
B. NAVAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM OVERVIEW
1. Background
The Naval Telecommunications System (NTS) overlays certain
communication pathways within the Defense Communications System (DCS) and
additionally includes naval telecommunication resources that specifically support
Navy and Marine operating forces. Although the NTS uses DCS pathways, they are
considered separate systems. NTS provides additional internal pathways between
Navy/Marine Corps users and the interface into externally employed DCS
communication pathways. Postal and guard mail services, Special Intelligence
(SPINTCOM), Critical Communications (CRITICOM), and electronic
intelligence/electronic warfare services are not part of the NTS. Marine Corps
managed and operated telecommunication systems are also not part of NTS,
however, as an operational extension of NTS, Marine systems generally follow
NTS operating procedures. (Ref. 5, p. II- 1)
DCS provides long-haul, point-to-point, and switched network
communication systems to meet the requirements of the Department of Defense,
including Navy and Marine Corps forces, and other government agencies as directed.
Common user sub-systems of the DCS include the Automatic Digital Network
(AUTODIN), the Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON), and the Automatic
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Secure Voice Communications Network (AUTOSEVOCOM). The Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) provides communication paths for strategic and
tactical requirements.
NTS provides common user communication services through Naval
Communications Area Master Stations (NAVCAMSs) and Naval Communication
Stations (NAVCOMSTAs) located around the world. They provide an interface to
AUTODIN for messages leaving the NTS (e.g., messages addressed to
Jomt/Unified/Army/Air Force commands). The Naval Communications Processing
and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) located at the servicing
NAVCAMS/NAVCOMSTA automatically routes mobile/afloat unit outgoing
messages either into AUTODIN, another NAVCOMPARS or to a Local Digital
Message Exchange (LDMX) which services shore based naval commands.
Additionally, mobile and afloat units may access AUTOVON and AUTOSEVOCOM
through a NAVCAMS or NAVCOMSTA.
2. UHF Satellite Communication Systems
For Marine Corps record (naval message type) and secure voice
communications, Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite communication (satcom)
common user systems provide an alternative to High Frequency (HF) and other long
haul communication systems. NTS provided UHF satcom pathways may be either
single use (e.g. tactical, point-to-point) or common user circuits. Common user
systems used by MAGTFs include the Fleet Satellite Broadcast; Common User
Digital Exchange System (CUDIXS)/Naval Modular Automated Communication
Sub-system (NAVMACS); full period satellite terminations; and the Secure Voice
Subsystem. (Ref. 6, p. 7)
The Fleet Satellite Broadcast (FSB) is an extension of the Fleet Broadcast
System which is used to deliver message traffic to afloat/mobile units. Host ships
guard4 for MAGTF traffic during amphibious operations until the MAGTF can
'Communication guard implies that a host ship or unit
provides message traffic receipt, transmission and page-copy
routing for an embarked or supported unit.
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establish communications ashore. Similarly during joint operations, a
communication guard is established with a host unit until MAGTF communication
systems are installed and operational. Once ashore, the MAGTF may continue to
receive the broadcast or may establish other lines of communications. Message
traffic addressed to an element of the MAGTF is entered by the originator into the
DCS or NTS where it is routed to a Naval Communications Processing and Routing
System (NAVCOMPARS) which guards for the host ship/MAGTF. At a
NAVCOMPARS, the message is automatically entered onto the appropriate Fleet
Broadcast (which may include FSB). Since the FSB is a one-way, send-only
communication link, message traffic is receipted for, serviced, or acknowledged
using separate communication systems. (Ref. 7, pp. 67-69)
CUDEXS/NAVMACS provide a UHF satellite communication link
between the shore based communication system and mobile units. CUDIXS is the
shore based, fixed plant receiving element of the network. The CUDIXS can
receive and acknowledge traffic from up to 50 primary subscribers. The CUDIXS
can transmit traffic to an additional ten subscribers designated as "special
subscribers". The CUDIXS is tied automatically to the NAVCOMPARS which in
turn is linked to AUTODEN and the NTS. NAVMACS is the mobile (transmission)
side of the network. (Ref. 7, pp. 69-70)
Full period satellite terminations are dedicated, multichannel or single
channel, full-duplex communication links between a MAGTF and a Naval
Communications Station (NAVCOMSTA) or a Naval Communications Area Master
Station (NAVCAMS). The NAVCOMPARS at the NAVCOMSTA or NAVCAMS
can automatically forward traffic addressed to the MAGTF or introduce traffic
received from the MAGTF into the NTS/DCS.
The Satellite Secure Voice Network provides to mobile units an interface
into the Defense Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network. Units with
NAVMACS capability may temporarily suspend message traffic operations and
establish a secure voice link. Alternatively, a separate or additional secure voice
circuits may be established using additional equipment.
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C. GROUND TERMINAL EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS
1. CUDIXS/NAVMACS (AN/TSC-96(V)).
Designed for rapid deployment and operations in severe environments, the
AN/TSC-96(V) Satellite Communication Center provides access to the Fleet
Broadcast, FLTSATCOM Secure Voice Network, and FLTSATCOM Common User
Digital Information Exchange System (CUDDCS) via NAVMACS. The AWTSC-96
is compatible in varying configurations with the Navy AN/WSC-3 radio and the
AN/PSC-3 radio. Specifically, the system provides:
• One secure, digitized voice communication circuit;
• Secure, half-duplex teletype for a NAVMACS-CUDDCS link; and
• Capability to copy 4 of 15 multiplexed FSB channels or provide an
additional secure voice channel.
AN/TSC-96(V) components are housed in a portable shelters. These shelters
may be truck or trailer mounted, air lifted, or embarked aboard amphibious
shipping. Portable generators supply the necessary power requirements. (Ref. 8, p.
D-29)
2. Single Channel UHF Satcom Terminals.
a. AN/PSC-3.
The AN/PSC-3 Manpack Satellite Communication Terminal is a
lightweight, compact, battery operated, and single channel communication terminal
designed for one person installation and operation. It is intended to provide single
channel UHF line of sight (LOS) and satellite communication terminations within
the Marine Expeditionary Force/Brigade/Unit. AN/WSC-3 transceivers are being
modified to allow satellite communications with the AN/PSC-3, which allows
communications to and from AN/TSC-96 and AN/WSC-3 radios. As its name
indicates, the AN/PSC-3 is transported by harnessing the radio to the operator's
back. The AN/PSC-3 is similar in size and weight to the common AN/PRC-77
VHF radio. As such, it is ideally suited to rapid deployment and quick reaction
communication requirements. Capabilities of the AN/PSC-3 include secure half-
duplex voice or digital communications. Digital communications are provided
through the AN/PSC-2 data communication terminal. (Ref. 8, p. 5-40)
23
b. AN/VSC-7.
The AN/VSC-7 is the vehicular version of the AN/PSC-3. It
functions as a net control station for up to 15 PSC-3s.
3. Upgrades And Projected Systems
a. AN/TSC-96 Product Improvement Program (PIP).
The PIP should be completed in the 1991 time frame and should:
• Repackage the components into a one-shelter configuration;
• Replace outdated teletypewriter/printer technology with the four AN/UGC-
74's;
• Upgrade communication security (COMSEC) equipment to retain
interoperability with USN equipment and provide the capability to
communicate with the AN/PSC-3; and
• Include the TD-1271B Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) modem
to provide more efficient use of the limited UHF spectrum and retain
interoperability with USN assets. (Ref. 8, p.5-40)
b. Advanced Manpacked UHF Terminal.
These upgrades are anticipated to begin in the 1992 time frame and
continue through 2001. These improvements include:
• Replacing the analog modulation scheme with a digitized voice capability;
and
• Replacement of all VHF and UHF single channel radios with an integrated
VHF/UHF single channel radio system. (Ref. 8, pp. 5-77, 5-114,)
D. CLOSING
To provide an insight on why the Marine Corps acquires UHF satcom ground
terminals, this chapter discussed briefly the UHF satcom pathways provided through
the Naval Telecommunications System. Additionally, it reviewed UHF satcom
ground terminal characteristics.
This thesis generally ignores the greater issue of demand for access to these
pathways and focuses simply on demand for access as represented by ownership of
or availability of these terminals.
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IV. MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses how needs of the Marine Corps are identified,
developed, and controlled by looking at the following topics:
• Prioritization and allocation of military satellite communication
(MILSATCOM) resources;
• The Marine Corps acquisition system; and
• The Department of Defense planning systems.
Figure 4 illustrates the bottom up view from the Marine Corps private user
level up through the DOD social user level. From this viewpoint, private users
generate user requirements in the form of requests. Social factors are theoretically
filtered into the request as the request moves up the chain of command.
Additionally, social users may generate separate requirements in response to a threat
or vulnerability not observed by the private user. Some requirements are "weeded
out" as unnecessary and discarded as they move up the chain. After the
requirements reach the top of the chain of command, they begin to influence the
acquisition process. The acquisition process reexamines these requirements through
milestone documentation.
B. PRIORITIZATION AND ALLOCATION OF MILSATCOM
RESOURCES
1. Background.
"The use of MILSATCOM systems is based on the validated operational
need and on current operational considerations indicating that a MILSATCOM
system, rather than an alternative transmission medium, should be used to satisfy the
requirement." [Ref. 9, p.25]
2. General Considerations.
Military satellite communication (MILSATCOM) resources are prioritized

















Figure 4 . Sequential weeding process
26
controlled by the Navy based on a predetermined, validated need; the need's relative
ranking among all needs serviced by the system (prioritization); and pathway
availability (current operational situations).
Marines (and other users) prioritize their needs based on:
• National security importance of the information to be transmitted;
• Time sensitivity of information;
• Availability and suitability of alternate means of communications;
• Impact on other users;
The effect of requirement satisfaction on other users; and
• Technical and operational employment considerations;
Including satellite loading and survivability. [Ref. 9, p. 26]
A quantitative decision process is used to determine the priority assigned
to individual requirements. Each category above (security importance, time
sensitivity, impact, etc.) is defined by a matrix. The matrix charts level of conflict
versus levels of satisfaction. Table 4 provides a matrix example.
3. User Requirements Data Base (URDB).
The URDB contains the list of MILSATCOM validated requirements and
their prioritization. Not all validated requirements, however, may be currently
supportable (this situation represents an excess demand for access). Validated
requirements are regularly reviewed for retention as mission needs change.
Initial military user needs are submitted using the MILSATCOM URDB
Requirement Request Form. Completed forms are forwarded through the chain of
command (either administrative or operational chains) to the Military Satellite
Communications System Office (MSO). The MSO evaluates the request and
forwards the request with any recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
for validation. Once validated, the need becomes a support requirement and is
entered into the URDB.
4. MILSATCOM URDB Requirement Request Form
The URDB MILSATCOM Requirement Request Form (DCA form 772)
presides justification for communication service requirements to be provided by a
new military satellite communication system, network, satellite constellation, or a
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change to a previous system. The form may also be used to recommend the
deletion of an existing requirement. Appendix A contains a sample form.





Priority 2 1 1 1
Immediate 3 2 2 2 3 1
Flash 4 5 5 5 5 6
Flash 5 6 7 7 7 8
Override
[Ref. 9, p. 32]
The economic model assumes the request originates at an operating unit
level (private user). The operating unit generally considers only those qualitative
determinants of supply associated with the private user.
As the request moves through the chain of command, the economic
model suggests that higher levels in the chain begin associating more of the "big
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picture" costs and benefits with the request (thereby refining the demand function
and social supply function definitions).
Finally, the economic model closes the loop at the point where the
URDB filters into Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System (PPBS) decisions.
At this point, the demand function and the social supply function are equated in
some fashion, and funds are allocated to provide the system or service requested.
This funding ideally relates to the optimal level determined by the intersection of
demand and supply functions (subject to any funding constraints).
C. MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION SYSTEM
1. Background.
The Defense Acquisition System functions concurrently with and in
support of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The Defense
Acquisition System provides the method within DOD for implementing systems
acquisition policy as directed by the President's Office of Management and Budget
(OMB Circular A- 109). Specific policies, practices and procedures which govern
DOD acquisitions include:
Definition of the systems acquisition cycle;
Determining and prioritizing resource requirements;
Systems acquisition process controls and direction;
Contracting; and
Reporting to Congress. [Ref. 10, pp. 1,2]
2. Marine Corps Acquisitions
Most acquisition programs benefiting the Marine Corps are joint programs
with other services or Federal agencies. For Marine unique programs or programs
which do not otherwise satisfy Marine specific requirements, the Marine Corps
Acquisition System is used. The Marine Corps Acquisition System closely parallels
guidelines and policies of the Defense Acquisition System. Assigned Marine Corps
acquisition responsibilities include:
• Developing new doctrine, tactics, and equipment employed by amphibious
landing forces;
• Identifying equipment, weapons, or weapons systems requirements; and
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• Developing, testing, and evaluating new systems;
— To ensure operational effectiveness;
— To ensure new systems meet long range and immediate objectives;
— To ensure new systems can be acquired and supported using available
resources. [Ref. 11, p. 1]
The Marine Corps Acquisition System has program decision authority for
Acquisition Categories IIC and HI (ACAT EC and ACAT HI). These categories
are established for programs having dollar thresholds (as of FY-80) less than $100
million for research, development, testing, and evaluation and $500 million for
procurement, operations, and maintenance [Ref. 11, p.5]. Additionally, Marine
Corps acquisition programs assigned ACAT IIC or ACAT HI do not meet the
criteria for special Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Navy interest.
For joint acquisition programs in which the Marine Corps is the lead
service (Acquisition categories I, US), the policies and guidelines of the Marine
Corps Acquisition System are modified as required to meet DOD and other service
requirements.
3. System Acquisition Cycle.
The system acquisition cycle defines documentation requirements,
establishes milestones and phases, and requires key decisions for each program.
The documentation provides a review of actions taken, decisions made, a validation
of current needs, a record of approval to enter follow-on phases and other
supporting rationale. Milestones mark the end points of each phase. Actions
within each phase are tailored to ''rninimize acquisition time and life-cycle costs,
consistent with the urgency of need and degree of technical risk involved, and
progress as demonstrated by validated test results." [Ref. 10, p. 3] Key decisions
provide approval to enter the next phase. Disapproval at any key decision point
may terminate the program. Figure 5 briefly outlines the relationship between






































Figure 5. Acquisition milestones, decisions, and phases
31
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS
Three legs comprise the Department of Defense planning system:
• Joint Operations Planning System;
• Joint Strategic Planning System; and
• Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System.
Together, they provide an integrated framework for formulating national security
policy, strategy, plans, and acquisition decisions. The Joint Operations Planning
System (JOPS) will not be discussed in detail, however, JOPS provides for written
operational plans in complete format (OPLAN) and operational plans in concept
foimat (CONPLAN) in response to the Joint Strategic Planning System threat
identification. The Joint Strategic Planning System and the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System directly influence the acquisition of UHF
satcom ground terminals, as well as all other acquisitions.
1. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
The primary objective of JSPS is to identify and evaluate military and
reltted threats to national security. These threats later lead to identification of needs
and requirements for combating the threat. The needs and requirements essentially
qualitatively describe a demand function.
JSPS produces several planning documents which include the Joint
Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP),
and the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM).
The Joint Strategic Planning Document provides JCS advice to the
President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on what military
strategy and force structure is required to attain U.S. national security objectives.
Additionally, it provides planning guidance to unified and specified commanders and
each military service. The JSPD does not consider fiscal restraints; it lists all
options and alternatives to be considered. The Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System is initiated by the JSPD.
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The Joint Program Assessment Memorandum is prepared for the Secretary
of Defense by the JCS. The JPAM contains their impartial risk assessment of
DOD's ability to execute approved military strategy.
2. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
The primary objective of PPBS is to allocate scarce
fiscal resources for the acquisition of those resources "necessary to meet the threat
and to execute the strategy identified by the JSPS." [Ref. 13, p. 52]
In economic terms, PPBS attempts to qualitatively describe a demand
function based on needs and requirements; as well as to describe a social supply
function based on observable costs. The hoped for end result is an optimal
allocation of scarce resources. PPBS does this by:
• Developing an acquisition strategy with regards to the threat;
• Developing force requirements to support the strategy; and
• Developing programs to provide an orderly basis for the achievement of
force objectives, weapons systems objectives and their logistics support.
[Ref. 13, p.51]
The JCS, unified and specified commanders, and military services advise
the Secretary of Defense through the PPBS concerning issues related to their
abilities to satisfy force requirements within fiscal constraints. The PPBS results in
budget inputs for the President's budget submission and provides the rationale for
the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).
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V. MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION AND ECONOMICS
A. INTRODUCTION
So far this thesis has described what UHF satcom ground terminals and
associated systems are available; what economic theory says about supply, demand,
and optimal quantities (how much do we buy?); and, what policies and practices
are currently used to make this economic decision.
This chapter examines how economics is applied in the established decision
making process.
B. HOW ECONOMICS VIEWS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND OPTIMAL
QUANTITIES
"Economic theory assumes an omniscient and omnipotent overseer who can
make perfectly informed decisions." [Ref. 14]
As discussed in Chapter n, economic theory says that for any UHF satcom
telecommunication system, private users such as a MAGTF could be associated with
a private supply function and a private demand function reflecting recognized costs
and benefits received. Additionally, the Marine Corps as a society would similarly
develop a social demand and supply function. Since the private users reap the
majority of benefits associated with access to terminals and satellite communication
systems, the social demand function would closely resemble the aggregate of all
private demand functions (e.g. the sum of multiple MAGTF's demand functions).
The social supply function, however, would be significantly different. All private
user recognized costs plus all private user non-recognized costs would factor into
the determinants of a social supply function.
Economics assumes that decision makers can identify and quantify all relevant
costs and benefits. In this setting, the Marine Corps can easily determine the
optimal quantity of AN/PSC-3s to purchase and provide to MAGTFs. As discussed
earlier, that point would be where the Social Marginal Costs just equals the Social
Marginal Benefit (MC = MB). The certain hue and cry from private users for
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additional AN/PSC-3s (e.g. , as an expression of excess demand for access) would be
controlled by one of several demand management techniques, depending upon the
reasons for excess demand and the effect desired.
Economic theory, however, fails to translate that simply into a decision
making model. The Solomon-like decision maker with the power to implement the
decision may be an unrealistic assumption. Instead, applied economics provides a
logical framework for analyzing problems and problem solving. Clearly, in most
decisions, a precise mathematical formula describing the demand function or supply
function will not exist. Applied economics, therefore, attempts to identify all
significant costs, benefits, and rational assumptions relating to the decision; then,
using the theoretical decision framework, deduce an approximate optimal level.
Some trial and error is expected for fine-tuning the assumptions in the economic
model.
C. HOW THE "SYSTEM" WORKS
In practice, there are no omniscient and omnipotent overseers. Bureaucracies
tend to have members with varied levels of expertise and multiple layers of diffuse
and incomplete information. Goals, motivations, and objectives differ between
layers.
Within a MAGTF, motivation, goals, and objectives center around
accomplishing an assigned mission with the fewest numbers of casualties (as well as
other social and political constraints). Demand, therefore, is not economically
constrained. A MAGTF would clearly want the best command and control system
available to accomplish its mission. Conversely, from the social viewpoint, giving
100-percent of all command and control assets (or even all the cream of the crop)
to a single MAGTF would reduce the overall effectiveness of other MAGTFs and
sister forces. Under certain circumstances, additional assets may be shifted to a
given MAGTF, however, decision makers try to optimize the overall force structure
using constrained fiscal assets.
The acquisition system uses at least two mechanisms to address the divergent
goals and incentives within the decision making hierarchy. First, the system tries to
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smooth the differences in experience and information between levels by moving
operationally experienced personnel into acquisition related billets and acquisition
experienced personnel back into operational billets. A well informed decision
making body is expected to then evolve. However, the system fails to mirror
economic theory because it is fundamentally unable to align private user
motivations, goals, and considerations with the social perspective.
Second, the system uses a "sequential weeding" process to weed out and
cultivate private user demands with regards to broader social factors and
considerations. Figure 4
,
page 26, helps illustrates this process. Assume that a
MAGTF as a private user submits a MILSATCOM URDB Requirement Request
Form. The chain of command reviews the request, modifies it based on broader
social factors (e.g. adding private user unrecognized costs, consolidating the request
with other similar requests, etc.) and forwards the request further up the chain. If
the request satisfies the broader decision criteria at each successive level, the
requirement is added to the URDB where JCS and PPBS priorities for acquisition
are influenced.
In terms of Figure 3, page 13, private users will submit requests up to the
point where PMC = D. Thus the requests submitted by the private users reflects
the private optimal allocation of resources. The user forces the system to eliminate
those requests where SMC > D. The system therefore requires information
regarding demand and the costs not incurred by the private users. For the
sequential weeding process to work successfully, this information must be provided
by the decision-making hierarchy.
The decision-making process and documentation requirements are designed to
provide the system with demand and cost information. For example, information
provided in the MILSATCOM URDB Requirement Request Form (Appendix A)
could be considered as a beginning point for defining the private user's (e.g.,
MAGTF) demand for access. In this case, demand for access to a specific UHF
satcom network implicitly contains a demand for access to UHF satcom ground
terminals. Without the terminals, the network is dysfunctional and meaningless.
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The Mission Element Need Statement (MENS), as shown in Appendix B,
begins to define qualitatively additional aspects of private user demand as well as
the social user demand function. MENS provides an assessment of need (Appendix
B, section D) which discusses the benefits of the system with regards to the need
being fulfilled. Similarly, social supply functions are qualitatively described in
economic terms. For example, MENS takes an initial stab at identifying social
determinants of supply. The types of constraints listed in Appendix B, section B,
give some clue to costs associated with the project. As seen previously in Table 2,
page 10, the bulk of supply costs are recognized only at the social level. In both
the Joint Strategic Planning Document (which eventually translates into taskings,
needs, and requirements) and the MJLSATCOM URDB Requirement Request Form,
private users are not constrained by economic fiscal considerations. In some cases,
accounting fiscal considerations are inappropriately considered as a qualitative
determinant of supply (e.g.; sunk costs in Appendix A, paragraph 18 comments:
"$50,000,000 has been spent on UHF terminals.") Accounting costs are not
necessarily economic costs and therefore do not figure into the supply function.
Economic costs refer to the marginal costs associated with acquiring more UHF
satcom ground terminals than presently held. Later in the PPBS cycle, other cost-
benefit analyses may be performed to more clearly identify aspects (determinants) of
the social supply function.
Throughout the PPBS process and the subsequent budget approval process,
tradeoffs occur which force an "optimal" solution to occur. Based on relative
priority of the acquisition and approved funding levels, program buy levels are cut,
modified, or otherwise affected (and in some cases, Congress may unilaterally
increase buy levels). Additionally, buys may be spread over several funding periods
and budgets. The resulting end quantity of units bought can be equated to an
optimal solution when viewed from the big picture level (although private users may
still argue that their individual demands have not been met and national security
thus suffers).
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D. CAN WE EXPECT THE "SYSTEM" TO WORK?
Critics and proponents alike point out the complexity of the acquisition
process. Critics argue that the system fails to bridge the gap between the "user"
and the "procurer". Proponents point out that the lack of user understanding of the
system leads to unrealistic expectations of performance. Assuming the same
perfectly informed body of decision makers that economic theory describes and goal
congruence throughout the acquisition process, clearly, the system should work well.
In fact, the system is suboptimal.
Information is asymmetrically distributed throughout the organization.
Decision makers at different layers know what they know, but have only limited
ways of identifying what information is held at other layers. Private users may
distort information, either purposefully to enhance their position or because they lack
information upon which to base their decision/requests. Decision makers at higher
levels have no independent source of information to evaluate subordinate decisions
or requests. They must rely heavily on private user provided information. Varying
degrees of expertise at each level can cause misinterpretations or oversights.
As discussed earlier, goals, motivations, and objectives differ between decision
making levels and these factors can further bias available information. The private
user has few incentives to provide complete, unbiased information. In fact, the
private user recognizes that good marketing techniques are required to receive
favorable consideration for a private user demand function requirement.
Asymmetrical information and divergent incentives can seriously compromise the
sequential weeding process embodied in acquisition practices.
There is empirical evidence that these flaws lead to system break-downs. For
example, the acquisition process for UHF satcom ground terminals was placed on
hold when it became apparent that the sequential weeding process was failing.
1. JCS Moratorium on Ground Terminal Acquisition
On 26 January 1982, the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Evaluation (USDRE) sent a memorandum to all service secretaries and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff concerning the "Uncontrolled Proliferation of Non-Processed UHF
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Satcom Terminals." [Ref. 15] This memorandum addressed USDRE's concern that
procurements were "out of control." [Ref. 15] Two issues were raised:
• Technical interoperability and joint interoperability of ground terminals and
satellite networks were at risk due to the variety of ground terminals being
procured from military and commercial sources; and
• It hypothesized that limiting the number of terminals would translate to
limiting the increasing demand for new satellite networks. [Ref. 15]
Acting on this memorandum, JCS imposed a moratorium on ground
terminal procurement. This moratorium was lifted several years later when a new
UHF satcom ground terminal procurement policy was unplaced. In general, the new
policy appointed the Army as the executive agent for purchasing portable ground
terminals, the Navy for shipboard terminals, and the Air Force for airborne
terminals. Justification was required showing that requested procurement quantities
directly supported a validated requirement and that the terminal met standardized
technical criteria.
2. The Moratorium Fallout
The moratorium provided emergency damage control to the system,
however, it may have failed to correct the problem. While the moratorium
stimulated concern for technical and joint interoperability criteria for ground terminal
systems, the second issue was not clearly addressed in the fix.
The moratorium created several new layers of information for decision
makers to consider. Given a fixed number of satellite pathways, users (social and
private) are still unable to determine the optimal number of ground terminals to
acquire. Employment objectives are still diverse. Two schools of employment
objectives emerged:
• Many low volume users share the same pathway (e.g. Fleet Satellite
Broadcast, CUDIXS/NAVMACS, a fleet satellite secure voice net, etc.)
This results in fewer pathways required; and
• Point to point, limited use, or specialized networks require more pathways
which would serve fewer users. [Ref. 15]
If the sequential weeding process resulted in the first school of thought
becoming the predominant network-type approved, then the moratorium incorrectly
correlated terminals and pathways. Pathways would have multiple users, therefore,
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numbers of terminals would not be a good indicator of pathways required. If the
predominance of networks had a low user to pathway ratios (e.g. 3 users to 1
pathway or point to point), then terminals would better predict pathway access
requirements. More terminals would result in more pathway demand.
E. FIXING THE SYSTEM
Recognizing that the system fails to achieve the goal of optimizing command
and control given fiscal constraints, and more specifically fails to optimize the
numbers of UHF satcom ground terminals required, four courses of action exist:
• Do nothing (and pray for the best);
• Continue to monitor the diffusion of information, expertise, goals,
objectives, etc. through additional administrative controls (an exogenous
approach);
• Change the system so that private user demand and supply functions more
closely resemble social demand and supply functions indicating that goal
congruence and information is shared at all levels (an endogenous
approach); and
• Some combination of the above.
1. Doing Nothing -- The Unanswer!
Doing nothing is not part of the Marine Corps culture. "Lead, follow, or
get the hell out of the way" more accurately describes Marine philosophy. Clearly,
if the system suffers, the Marine Corps (and DOD) must tackle the problem head
on.
2. Exogenous Versus Endogenous.
Both the exogenous and the endogenous approach borrow from the
principal-agent (agency) theory developed in accounting, finance, economics,
marketing, political science, sociology, and organizational behavior literature. "[The
principal-agent problem arises] when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and
agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what
the agent is actually doing." [Ref. 16, pp. 57-58].
In this case, the principal would be the Marine Corps as a social user.
Agents would include private users. As discussed earlier, there are conflicts in
goals between private and social users. Additionally, the information and experience
40
diffusion makes it costly and nearly impossible for the social user (principal) to
monitor the private user (agent) performance. Private user performance would
include defining private demand and supply functions. "As a result, agents can
engage in strategic behavior to further their objectives at the principal's expense."
[Ref, 17, p.l]
The current system employs an exogenous approach to force agents to
perform in the best interest of the principal. As noted, the checks and balances
(documentation, reports, decision memorandums, etc.) of the sequential weeding
process insufficiently provide the monitoring capability required for evaluating agent
performance. A significant problem in this approach is that higher levels in the
chain of command have limited access to reliable and independent information.
Most of the information upon which decisions are based comes from subordinates.
Thus, the reliance on subordinate furnished information or data creates difficulties in
monitoring subordinates. Due to this dependency, the exogenous approach has
limited effectiveness as an incentive for causing the agent to act in the best interest
of the principal. Additional red-tape and bureaucracy only adds costs and delays.
Negative incentives encourage private users to manipulate the system to avoid the
bureaucratic jungle and achieve their goals.
The endogenous approach would involve changing the current system to
include some type of incentive for private users to align their goals and demands
more closely with the social supply and demand functions. Demand management
techniques support this approach. As discussed earlier in Chapter II, demand
management techniques force the private user to recognize more of the costs
associated with the social supply curve. Pricing schemes which raise the cost borne
by the private user result in a lower quantity of UHF ground terminals demanded.
Ultimately, the goal is to cause the Private Marginal Cost Curve to equal the Social
Marginal Cost Curve (PMC = SMC). When this occurs, the agent's decision
criteria are the same as the principal's and therefore the agent responds in a manner
favorable to the principal.
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3. Trade-offs and Combinations.
The concept of private users paying for acquisition immediately sounds
foreign and untenable: The system doesn't work that way! Certainly the acquisition
culture has not supported such a concept until recently. Empirical review suggests,
however, that acquisition through CINC-initiative funds are essentially private user
economic decisions. These funds are allocated by designated commanders-in-chief
(CINCs) for acquiring theater specific equipment to include certain communication
assets. If the CINC feels strongly that the standard acquisition system has not
provided sufficient assets based on CINC priorities, the CINC has a limited budget
to satisfy this demand. In this manner, the CINC bears more of the social costs of
acquisition than the private user supply function would indicate.
Some control system is necessary, of course, to ensure that technical and
joint interoperability is maintained. A possible contributing factor to the JCS
moratorium on ground terminal acquisition mentioned earlier was the poorly
coordinated CINC-initiative funding for UHF satcom ground terminals which
resulted in interservice communication shortfalls.
The current system provides a framework for identifying social (military
wide) needs and requirements. Within this framework, approximate figures for
quantities of UHF satcom ground terminals can be derived. Using an appropriate
pricing scheme, the actual quantities could be fine tuned. High value users, such as
a Marine Expeditionary Force, would willingly pay for the level of ground terminals
they determined was required. Lower value users, perhaps a Marine Expeditionary
Unit, would have a lower quantity demanded and would be satisfied with fewer, less
costly to the private user, ground terminals.
The actual mechanics of private user and social user budgeting for
acquisition is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Throughout this thesis, economic theories and concepts have been used to
discuss allocating scarce fiscal resources for acquiring UHF satellite communication
ground terminals. The intent of the thesis was to provide an overview of current
acquisition practices and suggest places where applied economics could explicitly aid
in better decision making.
B. CONCLUSIONS
• Current acquisition practices appear inefficient and suboptimal. The
exogenous approach can create disincentives to optimal decision making.
• Applied economics, while requiring a significant change in the Marine
Corps acquisition culture, can improve the incentives for private users to
make appropriate acquisition decisions and requests. Using the endogenous
approach, the goals of the private user (e.g., MAGTF) become more
congruent with the goals of the social user (e.g., Marine Corps), thereby
creating an environment for improved decentralized decision making.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Several places throughout the thesis, questions have been generated concerning
the mechanics of implementing economic concepts or preparing the acquisition
culture for planned change. Additionally, due to the artificial focus of the thesis,
related acquisitions have been ignored. Similarly, this thesis has chosen not to
address questions about demand for access to satellite pathways and pathway usage
optimization. Any one of these gaps require additional consideration sufficient to
warrant a separate thesis.
Specific areas for follow-on research include:
• An economic evaluation of demand for access to ground terminal
management techniques;
— The mechanics of implementing pricing and priority schemes;
— A comparison of theoretical outcomes to experimentally based outcomes;
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• An economic evaluation of demand for access to satellite pathways and
associated demand management techniques; and
• An economic evaluation of demand for use of satellite communication
systems and associated demand management techniques5 .
5LCDR. K.A. Dimaggio's thesis, "Pricing as a Demand
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APPENDIX B
(FORMAT FOR THE MISSION ELEMENT NEED STATEMENT)
Prepare MENS in the following format. Do not exceed five pages, including
annexes. Reference supporting documentation.
A. MISSION
1. Mission Areas . Identify the mission areas addressed in this MENS. A
need can be common to more than one mission area. When this is the case,
identify the multiple mission areas.
2. Mission Element Need . Briefly describe the nature of the need in terms
of mission capabilities required and not the characteristics of a hardware or software
system.
B. THREAT OR BASIS FOR NEED
Summarize the basis for the need in terms of an anticipated change in the
projected threat, in terms of an exploitable technology, or in terms of non-threat-
related factors; e.g., continuing requirements for new pilots. When the need is
based on a threat change, assess the projected threat over the period of time for
which a capability is required. Highlight projected enemy force level and
composition trends, system capabilities, or technological developments that define
the quantity or quality of the forecast threat. Include comments by the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and provide specific references from which the threat
description is derived. Quantify the threat in numbers and capability. If nuclear
survivability and endurance are required mission capabilities, include an explicit
statement of this fact. When the need is based on exploitation of developing
technology, describe the benefits to mission
performance.
C. EXISTING AND PLANNED CAPABILITIES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS
MISSION
Briefly summarize the existing and planned DOD or allied capabilities to
accomplish the mission. This must not be a narrow, one-service view when looking
across a multiservice or an overlapping mission area, such as air defense.
Reference existing documentation, such as force structure documents.
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D. ASSESSMENT OF NEED
The most important part of the MENS is the evaluation of the ability of
current and planned capabilities to cope with the projected threat. Base the
evaluation on one or more of the following factors:
1. Deficiency in the existing capability, such as excessive manpower, logistic
support requirements, ownership costs, inadequate system readiness, or mission
performance.
2. Exploitable technological opportunity.
3. Force size or physical obsolescence of equipment.
4. Vulnerability of existing systems.
E. CONSTRAINTS
Identify key boundary conditions for satisfying the need, such as:
1. Timing of need.
2. Relative priority within the mission area.
3. The order of magnitude of resources the DOD component is willing to
commit to satisfy the need identified. This resource estimate is for initial
reconciliation of resources and needs. It is not to be considered as a program cost
goal or threshold.
4. Logistics, safety, health, energy, environment, manpower, and training
considerations.
5. Standardization of interoperability with NATO and among the DOD
components.
6. Potentially critical interdependences or interfaces with other systems, and
technology or development programs.
F. RESOURCE AND SCHEDULE TO MEET MILESTONE I
Identify an approximate schedule and an estimate of resources to be
programed along with the approach proposed for developing alternative concepts for
presentation to the Secretary of Defense at Milestone I.
[Extracted from Ref. 18, Appendix D]
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